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Case No. 20170022
INTHE

UT AH COURT OF APPEAL
STATE OF UTAH,

Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
TRAVIS SCOTT MURRAY,
Defendant/Appellant.

Brief of Appellee
INTRODUCTION
Murray pleaded guilty to felony driving under the influence of alcohol.
It was his fourth DUL The dish·ict court imposed the statutory prison term,
suspended it, and granted Murray probation.
Murray

admitted

violating

that

probation

by

(1)

using

methamphetamine, cocaine, and alcohol, and (2) violating the ignition
interlock requirement.

At the revocation hearing, he asked for an

opportunity for further treatment and to complete probation. He specifically
objected only to serving any jail time. The State and Adult Probation and
Parole asked the court to impose a one-year jail term to close the case out.
The district court revoked and reinstated Murray's probation, ordered
him to complete substance-abuse counseling, and imposed a 180-day jail
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term. It said it was granting Murray's request with the exception that it
imposed a 180-day jail term. Murray responded, "Thank you." He never
objected that the court should have continued the original probation rather
than revoking and reinstating probation.
On appeal, Murray argues that the district court erred by revoking and
reinstating probation rather than continuing his original probation.

He

argues that the error was plain because the probation relief granted varied
from what both parties requested. But he cites no cases holding that the
parties' requests bound a court's discretion about when and how to grant
probation.
And Murray has not otherwise shown that the district court plainly
abused its discretion. The district court had to decide what to do with a
habitual drunk driver who violated his probation by drinking alcohol and
circumventing the ignition interlock requirement- the technological means
intended to prevent him from driving drunk again. Rather than impose the
original prison sentence or even sending Murray to jail for a year on an
unsuccessful probation finding, the court exercised extraordinary grace and
allowed him another opportunity to successfully complete his probation.
And Murray has inadequately briefed his prejudice argument. He
concludes that his probation likely would have ended sooner had the district

-2-
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court not revoked and reinstated. But the court could have extended his
original probation, and Murray offers no reasoned explanation why the
district court would have chosen a shorter period on an extended rather than
reinstated probation.
ISSUE
Has Murray shown that the trial court plainly erred when it revoked
and reinstated his probation rather than continued his original probation?

Standard of Review. Appellate courts review probation decisions for an
abuse of discretion. See, e.g., State v. Snyder, 2015 UT App 172 ,I7, 355 P.3d
246. Because Murray did not preserve the issue he raises on appeal, he must

show that the district court plainly erred. See, e.g., State v. Jenkins, 2016 UT
App 41 if 2, 368 P.3d 873.
STA TEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Facts.

A trooper pulled Murray over for speeding and running a red light.
When the trooper talked to Murray, he could smell alcohol. Murray admitted
consuming alcohol. The intoxilyzer revealed a breath alcohol content of .141.
When the trooper checked Murray's driver record, he discovered that Murray
had three prior DUI convictions. R4.
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B.

Proceedings.

The State charged Murray with (1) third-degree-felony driving under
the influence (Utah Code Ann. §41-6a-502 (West Supp. 2017-2018)), (2) classB-misdemeanor alcohol restricted driver (§41-6a-530 (West 2013)), (3) classC-misdemeanor speeding (§41-6a-601 (West 2013)), and (4) class-Cmisdemeanor running a red light (§41-6a-305 (West Supp. 2017-2018)). R2-3.
Murray and the State worked out a plea agreement. Murray pleaded

guilty to third-degree-felony DUI. In exchange, the State dismissed the other
three counts and agreed to "recommend 62.5 days." R29-34.
The district court entered judgment on March 17, 2014. It imposed and
suspended the statutory zero-to-five-year prison term. It ordered Murray to
serve 100 days in jail, giving him nine days credit for the time he already
served. It imposed a $2876.70 fine. R40-41.
~:

The court also gave Murray probation. The conditions included (1)
cooperating in treatment assessment and completing any treahnent deemed
necessary, (2) refraining from alcohol and illegal drug use, (3) submitting to
alcohol and drug testing, (4) paying for ignition interlock systems to be
installed on any vehicle Murray owned or operated, (5) maintaining
automobile insurance, and (6) reporting to Adult Probation and Parole as
directed. R41.
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About 23 months later, Murray violated his probation. AP&P reported
10 violations. Murray admitted to four: (1) he used methamphetamine,
cocaine, and alcohol; (2) he violated the ignition interlock restriction; (3) he
operated a car without insurance; and (4) he failed to report as directed by
AP&P.

AP&P recommended

terminating Murray's

probation as

unsuccessful and committing him to the Salt Lake County Jail for a term the
district court would deem sufficient to close the case. R70-75, 103-104.
At the subsequent hearing, the State submitted on AP&P' s
recommendation and asked the court to impose a one-year jail term. R104106 (the entire hearing transcript is attached as addendum B).
Murray's counsel opposed any jail time. She addressed the violations
by explaining that Murray found himself homeless and "did not deal with''
the situation "in an appropriate way." She reminded that Murray "had
established himself as someone who is able and willing to complete treatment
and he already" had. But she also acknowledged that his "actions after that"
had shown that "he could benefit from more treatment." She represented
that Murray "would very much like to complete probation" and "the
opportunity to do treatment." R102, 105-107.
The district court acknowledged that Murray's use of controlled
substances violated his probation. But it was the alcohol related violations
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that troubled the court most. It emphasized that Murray was guilty of thirddegree-felony DUI because he had a history of DUI. It emphasized that his
use of alcohol combined with violating the ignition interlock requirement
made him a danger to himself, his family, and "the community as a whole."
The court recognized that it "could very fairly" impose the original prison
sentence because he had violated his probation. R110.
The district court nevertheless decided not to impose the prison
sentence. The court instead granted Murray's requests for an opportunity for
additional treatment and to successfully complete probation. But the court
imposed the price of a 180-day jail term. And the court warned that if Murray
did not comply, he would not get "a year in jail to close," but Would instead
face the original prison sentence. R111-12.
The district court then revoked and reinstated Murray's probation for
12 months from the date of the hearing and imposed the 180-day jail term.
The court reiterated its view that the 180-day jail term was the only place
where it and the defense disagreed. When the court concluded, Murray
responded, "Thank you." He did not object that the court actually had not
given him what he requested or that it should have continued probation
rather than revoking and reinstating probation. Id.

-6-
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ARGUMENT SUMMARY
A district court has discretion to grant, deny, or revoke probation.
Even when a district court revokes probation, an appellate court will reverse
only when the evidence of a probation violation is so deficient that the district
court abused its discretion. And a single supported violation will justify a
decision to revoke probation.
Murray admitted to four probation violations. But he asked that the
district court given him an opportunity to successfully complete probation
and for more treatment. On appeal, he argues that the district court abused
its discretion when it granted his request through revoking and reinstating
his probation rather than continuing under the original probation.
Murray did not preserve this argument. He never objected to the
district court's chosen route to give him what he asked for. Instead, he
thanked the court.
On appeal, he has not proven plain error. He argues only that the
district court plainly erred because its solution conflicted with what both
parties requested. But he cites no clear law establishing that the parties'
requests bounded the district court's discretion.
Any he has not otherwise shown that the district court plainly abused
its discretion. The court had to decide how to deal with a habitual drunk
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driver whose probation violations showed he had again become a drunkdriving threat to the community-he had resumed drinking and
circumvented the interlock ignition probation requirement. Under the law,
the court was entitled revoke probation. It chose instead to give Murray the
opportunity he asked for.
Finally, Murray has inadequately briefed his prejudice argument. He
concludes that the original probation would likely have been completed by
now.

But because Murray violated his probation, the district court had

authority to extend its original term. Murray offers no reasoned analysis why
the court would have reached a different conclusion about how much longer
to keep him on probation under the original probation instead of under
revoked and reinstated probation.

ARGUMENT
The disi:rict court did not plainly abuse its discretion when in
response to serious probation violations, it revoked and
reinstated Murray's probation rather than continuing his
original probation

A dish·ict court has discretion to grant, deny, or revoke probation. See,

e.g., Snyder, 2015 UT App 172 if 7. And even when a district court revokes
probation, the appellate courts will not reverse unless '"the evidence of a
probation violation, viewed in the light most favorable to the trial court's
findings, is so deficient that the trial court abused its discretion .... "' Jenkins,
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2016 UT App 41

if 2.

Because Murray did not preserve his appellate

argument-that the trial court should have continued the original probation
rather than revoking it and reinstating it-he must show that the district
court plainly abused its discretion.
Murray has not met his burden. Here, the evidence of a probation
violation was strong- Murray admitted to four violations. Yet the trial court
still did not revoke his probation and send him to prison. It revoked and
reinstated his probation to give him what he asked for-the opportunity for
more treatment and to successfully complete probation.
A. Murray did not preserve his appellate issue that the district
court should have continued his probation rather than revoke
and reinstate it.

To preserve an issue for appeal, the appellant must have presented it
to the district court in a way that gave the court a fair opportunity to rule on
it. See, e.g., State v. Robinson, 2014 UT App 114 if 10, 327 P.3d 589. Murray did
not give the district a fair opportunity to rule on whether he was entitled to
have his original probation continued or whether the court was free to revoke
and reinstate his probation. In fact, the district court fairly believed that, with
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one exception not relevant here, it had given Murray all that he had asked

for. 1
Murray told the district court he "would very much like to complete
probation" and "the opportunity to do treatment." Rl0S-106. The district
court gave him both- by reinstating probation, it gave him to opportunity to
complete it, and it ordered further treatment as a condition of his reinstated
probation.
And it is clear from the record that the district court believed that it
was giving Murray what he was asking for. The court said that Murray's
"requests that [he] would like an opportunity to do this successfully and do
treah11ent is going to be granted." The court then proceeded to revoke and
reinstate probation and ordered that Murray successfully complete substance
abuse treatment. Murray never objected that the court gave him less than he
had asked for, let alone ask the court to continue his original probation. To
the contrary, he thanked the court. Rlll-12.

1

Murray expressly objected only to imposing jail time. In a footnote,
Murray concedes that he has served his jail sentence and continues that he is
serving the reinstated probation term "that is the subject of this appeal."
Aplt.Br.6 n.1. Yet throughout his brief he argues that the district abused its
discretion by both (1) revoking and reinstating probation, and (2) imposing a
180-day jail term. Because he has served that term, the court cannot grant
him relief and the issue is moot.

-10Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
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Nothing in this exchange gave the district court a fair opportunity to
address whether it should have continued his original probation. Rather,
everything suggested to the court that Murray was satisfied with revoking
and reinstating his probation as the means to grant his requests for treatment
and an opportunity to successfully complete probation.
Murray nevertheless says he preserved the appellate issue "by trial
counsel's argument to allow Murray to continue on probation without revoking

and reinstating probation." Aplt.Br.9 (emphasis added). Except trial counsel
never made that argument. She asked only that Murray have the opportunity
to successfully complete probation. Rl0S-107. She never argued that the
court should not grant that request by revoking and reinstating probation.

Id. And when the district court said that it was granting counsel's request
through revoking and reinstating probation, counsel did not object and
Murray thanked the court. Rlll-12.
Murray never gave the court a fair opportunity to address his appellate
issue. That issue may therefore be reviewed only for plain error.
B. Murray has not shown that the district court plainly abused its
discretion by allowing him another opportunity to successfully
complete probation through revoking and reinstating
probation.

Murray argues alternatively that the district court plainly erred by
revoking and reinstating probation because, according to him, that relief

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library,
-11- J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

conflicted with what the parties asked for. He says that the State asked to
revoke his probation and impose a jail sentence. He says he asked the court
to" continue on probation." Aplt.Br.10.
I

But an "error is obvious only if the law governing the error was clear
at the time the alleged error was made."' State v. Maestas. 2012 UT 46 ,I37, 299
P.3d 892 (citation omitted). Murray cites no case holding that a district court's
probation decisions are limited to selecting between the parties' requests. He
makes no other obvious error argument. His plain error argument fails for
that reason alone. 2
In any event, Murray cannot prove that the district court abused its
discretion, plainly or otherwise.

Even when a district court revokes

probation, this Court will reverse only when

11111

the evidence of a probation

violation, viewed in the light most favorable to the trial court's findings, is so
deficient that the trial court abused its discretion in revoking defendant's
probation.""' Jenkins, 2016 UT App 41 ,I2 (citations omitted). A

111

single

violation of probation is legally sufficient to support a probation revocation."'

Snyder, 2015 UT App 172 ,I7, 355 P.3d 246 (citation omitted).

...'"··'
2

As demonstrated in subpoint A, Murray did not make plain that the
district court had somehow not followed his request. He asked for an
opportunity to successfully complete probation. The district court gave him
that instead of revoking his probation and sending him to prison.

-12-

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Murray admitted four violations, three more than the district court
needed to revoke his probation outright. The district court thus correctly
recognized that it could have revoked Murray's probation and sent him to
prison.
But it didn't. Instead, the district court reinstated his probation. On
this record, that was an act of extraordinary grace. This case was Murray's
fourth DUI conviction. The violations that led to revoking his probation
involved resumed alcohol use and circumventing the ignition interlock- the
technological safeguard against him driving drunk yet again. The court
rightly recognized that despite what he may have accomplished before, he
had again become a threat to the community. Based on Murray's admitted
probation violations and the renewed threat he posed, the court could have
properly exercised its discretion to revoke his probation and send him to
prison.

The court nevertheless showed Murray extraordinary mercy by

reinstating his probation. It thus did not plainly err by not granting relief that
Murray never actually asked for in the first place- continuing with the
original probation.
Finally, Murray has inadequately briefed his prejudice argument, and
the Court should affirm for that reason alone. Murray concludes that had the
district court continued his original probation he "likely" would have
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"completed his probationary period earlier." Aplt.Br.10. But he offers no
reasoning why this was so. Because Murray violated his probation, the
district court was free to extend the period of his original probation. Utah
Code Ann. §77-18-1(12)(a)(i) (West Supp. 2017-2018).

And the court

apparently believed that an additional 12 months of probation was
appropriate. Murray offers no reasoned analysis why the court would have
reached a different conclusion about how much longer to keep him on
probation under the original probation instead of under revoked and
reinstated probation.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm.
Respectfully submitted on November 22, 2017.
D. REYES
Utah Attorney General

SEAN

I

Deputy Solicitor General
Counsel for Appellee
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Utah Code Annotated§ 77-18-1 (West2017) Suspension of sentence--Pleas held
in abeyance--Pro bation--Supervision--Presentence investigation--Standards-Confidentiality--Terms and conditions--Termination, revocation, modification,
or extension--Hearings--Elech·onic monitoring

(1) On a plea of guilty or no contest entered by a defendant in conjunction with a
plea in abeyance agreement, the court may hold the plea in abeyance as provided
in Title 77, Chapter 2a, Pleas in Abeyance, and under the terms of the plea in
abeyance agreement.
(2) (a) On a plea of guilty, guilty with a mental illness, no contest, or conviction of
any crime or offense, the court may, after hnposing sentence, suspend the
execution of the sentence and place the defendant on probation. The court
may place the defendant:
(i) on probation under the supervision of the Department of Corrections
except in cases of class C misdemeanors or infractions;
(ii) on probation under the supervision of an agency of local government
or with a private organization; or
(iii) on court probation under the jurisdiction of the sentencing court.
(b) (i) The legal custody of all probationers under the supervision of the
department is with the deparhnent.
(ii) The legal custody of all probationers under the jurisdiction of the
sentencing court is vested as ordered by the court.
(iii) The court has continuing jurisdiction over all probationers.
(iv) Court probation may include an administrative level of services,
including notification to the court of scheduled periodic reviews of the
probationer's compliance with conditions.
(c) Supervised probation services provided by the department, an agency of
local government, or a private organization shall specifically address the
offender's risk of reoffending as identified by a validated risk and needs
screening or assessment.
(3) (a) The departlnent shall establish supervision and presentence investigation
standards for all individuals referred to the deparhnent. These standards shall
be based on:
(i) the type of offense;
(ii) the results of a risk and needs assessment;
(iii) the de1nand for services;
(iv) the availability of agency resources;

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

(v) public safety; and
(vi) other criteria established by the departinent to detennine what level of
services shall be provided.
(b) Proposed supervision and investigation standards shall be submitted to
the Judicial Council and the Board of Pardons and Parole on an annual basis
for review and comment prior to adoption by the department.
(c) The Judicial Council and the deparhnent shall establish procedures to
implement the supervision and investigation standards.
(d) The Judicial Council and the deparhnent shall annually consider
modifications to the standards based upon criteria in Subsection (3)(a) and
other criteria as they consider appropriate.
(e) The Judicial Council and the deparhnent shall annually prepare an impact
report and submit it to the appropriate legislative appropriations
subcommittee.
(4) Notwithstanding other provisions of law, the department is not required to
supervise the probation of persons convicted of class B or C misde1neanors or
infractions or to conduct presentence investigation reports on class C
misdemeanors or infractions. However, the deparhnent may supervise the
probation of class B misdemeanants in accordance with department standards.
(5) (a) Before the imposition of any sentence, the court may, with the concurrence
of the defendant, continue the date for the imposition of sentence for a
reasonable period of time for the purpose of obtaining a presentence
investigation report from the department or infonnation fr01n other sources
about the defendant.
(b) The presentence investigation report shall include:
(i) a victim iinpact statement according to guidelines set in Section 77-38a203 describing the effect of the crhne on the victim and the victim1s family;
(ii) a specific statement of pecuniary damages, accompanied by a
recommendation from the departlnent regarding the payment of
restitution with interest by the defendant in accordance with Title 77,
Chapter 38a, Crime Victims Restitution Act;
(iii) findings from any screening and any assessment of the offender
conducted under Section 77:18:11;
(iv) recommendations for ti·eatment of the offender; and
(v) the number of days since the commission of the offense that the
offender has spent in the custody of the jail and the number of days, if any,
the offender was released to a supervised release or alternative
incarceration program under Section 17-22-5.5.
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(c) The contents of the presentence investigation report are protected and are
not available except by court order for purposes of sentencing as provided by
rule of the Judicial Council or for use by the deparhnent.
(6) (a) The department shall provide the presentence investigation report to the
defendant's attorney, or the defendant if not represented by counsel, the
prosecutor, and the court for review, three working days prior to sentencing.
Any alleged inaccuracies in the presentence investigation report, which have
not been resolved by the parties and the department prior to sentencing, shall
be brought to the attention of the sentencing judge, and the judge may grant
an additional 10 working days to resolve the alleged inaccuracies of the report
with the departn1ent. If after 10 working days the inaccuracies cannot be
resolved, the court shall make a determination of relevance and accuracy on
the record.
(b) If a party fails to challenge the accuracy of the presentence investigation
report at the time of sentencing, that matter shall be considered to be waived.
(7) At the time of sentence, the court shall receive any testimony, evidence, or
information the defendant or the prosecuting attorney desires to present
concerning the appropriate sentence. This testimony, evidence, or information
shall be presented in open court on record and in the presence of the defendant.
(8) While on probation, and as a condition of probation, the court 1nay require
that the defendant:
(a) perform any or all of the following:
(i) provide for the support of others for whose support the defendant is
legally liable;
(ii) participate in available treatment programs, including any treahnent
program in which the defendant is currently participating, if the program
is acceptable to the court;
(iii) if on probation for a felony offense, serve a period of time, not to
exceed one year, in a county jail designated by the deparhnent, after
considering any recommendation by the court as to which jail the court
finds most appropriate;
(iv) serve a term of home confinement, which may include the use of
electronic monitoring;
(v) participate in compensatory service restitution programs, including the
compensatory service program provided in Section 76-6-107.1;
(vi) pay for the costs of investigation, probation, and treatment services;
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(vii) 1nake restitution or reparation to the victhn or victhns with interest in
accordance with Title 77, Chapter 38a, Crime Victilns Restitution Act; and
(viii) comply with other tenns and conditions the court considers
appropriate to ensure public safety or increase a defendant's likelihood of
success on probation; and
(b) if convicted on or after May 5, 1997:
(i) complete high school classwork and obtain a high school graduation
diploma, a GED certificate, or a vocational certificate at the defendant's
own expense if the defendant has not received the diploma, GED
certificate, or vocational certificate prior to being placed on probation; or
(ii) provide documentation of the inability to obtain one of the items listed
in Subsection (8)(b)(i) because of:
(A) a diagnosed learning disability; or
(B) other justified cause.
(9) The departinent shall collect and disburse the accounts receivable as defined
by Section 77-32a-101, with interest and any other costs assessed under Section
64-13-21 during:
(a) the parole period and any extension of that period in accordance with
Subsection 77-27-6(4); and
(b) the probation period in cases for which the court orders supervised
probation and any extension of that period by the department in accordance
with Subsection (10).
(10) (a)(i) Probation 1nay be terminated at any time at the discretion of the court
or upon completion without violation of 36 months probation in felony or
class A misde1neanor cases, 12 months in cases of class B or C
misdemeanors or infractions, or as allowed pursuant to Section 64-1321 regarding earned credits.
(ii) (A) If, upon expiration or termination of the probation period under
Subsection (l0)(a)(i), there re1nains an unpaid balance upon the
accounts receivable as defined in Section 77-32a-101, the court may
retain jurisdiction of the case and continue the defendant on bench
probation for the lin1ited purpose of enforcing the payment of the
account receivable. If the court retains jurisdiction for this limited
purpose, the court may order the defendant to pay to the court the costs
associated with continued probation under this Subsection (10).
(B) In accordance with Section 77-18-6, the court shall record in the
registry of civil judgments any unpaid balance not already recorded
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and ilnmediately transfer responsibility to collect the account to the
Office of State Debt Collection.
(iii) Upon motion of the Office of State Debt Collection, prosecutor, victim,
or upon its own 1notion, the court may require the defendant to show
cause why the defendant's failure to pay should not be h·eated as contempt
of court.
(b) (i) The deparhnent shall notify the sentencing court, the Office of State
Debt Collection, and the prosecuting attorney in writing in advance in all
cases when termination of supervised probation is being requested by the
departinent or will occur by law.
(ii) The notification shall include a probation progress report and complete
report of details on outstanding accounts receivable.
(11)

(a)(i) Any time served by a probationer outside of confine1nent after
having been charged with a probation violation and prior to a hearing to
revoke probation does not constitute service of time toward the total
probation term unless the probationer is exonerated at a hearing to revoke
the probation.
(ii) Any time served in confinement awaiting a hearing or decision
concerning revocation of probation does not constitute service of thne
toward the total probation term unless the probationer is exonerated at the
hearing.
(iii) Any time served in confinement awaiting a hearing or decision
concerning revocation of probation constitutes service of time toward a
tenn of incarceration imposed as a result of the revocation of probation or
a graduated sanction imposed under Section 63M-7-404.
(b) The rmming of the probation period is tolled upon the filing of a violation
report with the court alleging a violation of the terms and conditions of
probation or upon the issuance of an order to show cause or warrant by the
court.

(12)

(a)(i) Probation may be modified as is consistent with the graduated
sanctions and incentives developed by the Utah Sentencing Commission
under Section 63M-7-404, but the length of probation may not be extended,
except upon waiver of a hearing by the probationer or upon a hearing and
a finding in court that the probationer has violated the conditions of
probation.
(ii) Probation may not be revoked except upon a hearing in court and a
finding that the conditions of probation have been violated.
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(b) (i) Upon the filing of an affidavit alleging with particularity facts asserted
to constitute violation of the conditions of probation, the court that
authorized probation shall determine if the affidavit establishes probable
cause to believe that revocation, modification, or extension of probation is
justified.
(ii) If the court determines there is probable cause, it shall cause to be
served on the defendant a warrant for the defendant's arrest or a copy of
the affidavit and an order to show cause why the defendant's probation
should not be revoked, 1nodified, or extended.
(c) (i) The order to show cause shall specify a time and place for the hearing
and shall be served upon the defendant at least five days prior to the
hearing.
(ii) The defendant shall show good cause for a continuance.
(iii) The order to show cause shall inform the defendant of a right to be
represented by counsel at the hearing and to have counsel appointed if the
defendant is indigent.
(iv) The order shall also infonn the defendant of a right to present
evidence.
(d) (i) At the hearing, the defendant shall ad1nit or deny the allegations of the
affidavit.
(ii) If the defendant denies the allegations of the affidavit, the prosecuting
attorney shall present evidence on the allegations.
(iii) The persons who have given adverse information on which the
allegations are based shall be presented as witnesses subject to questioning
by the defendant unless the court for good cause otherwise orders.
(iv) The defendant 1nay call witnesses, appear and speak in the defendant's
own behalf, and present evidence.
(e) (i) After the hearing the court shall make findings of fact.
(ii) Upon a finding that the defendant violated the conditions of probation,
the court 1nay order the probation revoked, modified, continued, or
reinstated for all or a portion of the original term of probation.
(iii) If a period of incarceration is imposed for a violation, the defendant
shall be sentenced within the guidelines established by the Utah
Sentencing Commission pursuant to Subsection 63M-7-404(4), unless the
judge detennines that:
(A) the defendant needs substance abuse or mental health tTeabnent, as
determined by a validated risk and needs screening and assessment,
that warrants treatment services that are irmnediately available in the
c01n1nunity; or
(B) the sentence previously imposed shall be executed.
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(iv) If the defendant had, prior to the i1nposition of a term of incarceration
or the execution of the previously i1nposed sentence under this Subsection
(12), served time in jail as a condition of probation or due to a violation of
probation under Subsection (12)(e)(iii), the time the probationer served in
jail constitutes service of time toward the sentence previously imposed.
(13) The court may order the defendant to commit himself or herself to the
custody of the Division of Substance Abuse and Mental Health for treahnent at
the Utah State Hospital as a condition of probation or stay of sentence, only after
the superintendent of the Utah State Hospital or the superintendent's designee
has certified to the court that:
(a) the defendant is appropriate for and can benefit from treatment at the state
hospital;
(b) h·eatment space at the hospital is available for the defendant; and
(c) persons described in Subsection 62A-15-610(2)(g) are receiving priority for
treahnent over the defendants described in this Subsection (13).
(14) Presentence investigation reports are classified protected in accordance with
Title 63G, Chapter 2, Government Records Access and Manage1nent Act.
Notwithstanding Sections 63G-2-403 and 63G-2-404, the State Records
Co1nmittee may not order the disclosure of a presentence investigation report.
Except for disclosure at the time of sentencing pursuant to this section, the
department may disclose the presentence investigation only when:
(a) ordered by the court pursuant to Subsection 63G-2-202(7);
(b) requested by a law enforcement agency or other agency approved by the
department for purposes of supervision, confinement, and treatment of the
offender;
(c) requested by the Board of Pardons and Parole;
(d) requested by the subject of the presentence investigation report or the
subject's authorized representative; or
(e) requested by the victin1 of the crime discussed in the presentence
investigation report or the victim's authorized representative, provided that
the disclosure to the victim shall include only information relating to
statements or materials provided by the victim, to the circumstances of the
crime including statements by the defendant, or to the impact of the crime on
the victim or the victim's household.
(15)(a) The court shall consider home confinement as a condition of probation
under the supervision of the department, except as provided in Sections 76-3406 and 76-5-406.5.
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(b) The department shall establish procedures and standards for home
confinement, including electronic monitoring, for all individuals referred to
the department in accordance with Subsection (16).
(16)(a) If the court places the defendant on probation under this section, it may
order the defendant to participate in home confinement through the use of
electronic monitoring as described in this section until further order of the
court.
(b) The elech·onic monitoring shall alert the department and the appropriate
law enforcement unit of the defendant's whereabouts.
(c) The elech·onic monitoring device shall be used under conditions which
require:
(i) the defendant to wear an electronic monitoring device at all times; and
(ii) that a device be placed in the home of the defendant, so that the
defendant's compliance with the court's order may be monitored.
(d) If a court orders a defendant to participate in home confinement through
electronic monitoring as a condition of probation under this section, it shall:
(i) place the defendant on probation under the supervision of the
Deparbnent of Corrections;
(ii) order the department to place an electronic 1nonitoring device on the
defendant and install electronic monitoring equip1nent in the residence of
the defendant; and
(iii) order the defendant to pay the costs associated with home
confinement to the department or the progra1n provider.
(e) The department shall pay the costs of home confinement through
electronic monitoring only for those persons who have been determirted to be
indigent by the court.
(f) The department may provide the elech·onic 1nonitoring described in this
section either directly or by conh·act with a private provider.
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SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH; DECEMBER 12, 2016

1
•-.Jj

JUDGE ANN BOYDEN

2

(Transcriber's note:

3

may not be accurate with the audio recordings.)

4

PROCEEDINGS

5
6

Identification of speakers

(Time 10:59:48)

7

MS. DUNROE: Travis Murray, please?

8

THE COURT:

9

Is Mr. Murray in custody?

10

MS. DUNROE:

11

THE COURT:

Murray, thank you.

He is.
All right.

With Mr. Murray,

I am

12

dealing with affidavits from AP&P alleging violations of the

13

probation on this third degree DUI.

14

in February of 2016 but I have since received a more updated

15

one but it's a month later.

I received the first one

My most recent one is March

16
17

MS. DUNROE:

That's what I have as well and I

18

confirmed with AP&P today that that's the most recent one

19

they have.

20

THE COURT:

21

MS. DUNROE:

22

THE COURT:

23

MS. DUNROE:

24
25

So how are we addressing those?
Can I have just a quick moment?
Uh-huh (affirmative).
Judge, Mr. Murray intends to enter

admissions to numbers 1, 4, 6 and 9.
THE COURT:

All right. And agreed upon
1
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1

recommendations, are we looking at what has - the

2

recommendation is closing with jail time?

3

other ...
MS. DUNROE:

4
5

other commitments.

6

be requested by AP&P.

No, he's not currently serving any

We don't stipulate to the jail that will

THE COURT:

7

Is he serving

We have a separate You want to make some argument with

8

that, but there hasn't been an agreed upon. And it's 1, 3, 4,

9

and 9 or what?

10

MS. DUNROE:

11

THE COURT:

12

It's 1, 4,

6 and 9.

That's actually what I circled but then

I didn't trust my numbers.
MS. DUNROE:

13

And numbers 3, 4, 5, 6,

7 and 8 result

14

from events that ended up in the filing of Justice Court case

15

number THE COURT:

16
17

MS. DUNROE:

19

THE COURT:

21

And that's how

it was resolved was No. 4?

18

20

All from the same date?

Correct, well,

4 and 6.

Four and 6, so that makes sense to that

one.
All right Mr. Murray, this makes sense to me.

What

22

you need to know before you make any admissions is we're not

23

dealing with the case in the justice court, we're dealing

24

with how I should address a third degree DUI that you're on

25

probation for.

If you admit that you're not compliant or if
2
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1

I find that you're not compliant, you risk losing the

2

privilege of probation altogether and having the zero to five

3

years prison sentence imposed.

4

DEFENDANT MURRAY:

5

THE COURT:

Do you understand that?

Yes.

Without any further evidentiary

6

hearing,

7

today or do you want me to set it for - you want to make the

8

admissions today as your attorney has said or do you want me

9

to set it for an evidentiary hearing?

10
11

is it your decision to make those admissions to me

DEFENDANT MURRAY:

No ma'am,

I'd just like to move

forward with -

12

THE COURT:

With those admissions today?

13

DEFENDANT MURRAY:

14

THE COURT:

Yes.

Number 1 is that you used alcohol,

15

meth, and cocaine on October - excuse me - January 8 th of

16

2016, you admit that?

17

DEFENDANT MURRAY:

18

THE COURT:

19

Yes, ma'am.

The next line also includes opiates.

All four substances on that January 8 th date?

20

DEFENDANT MURRAY:

21

THE COURT:

Yes, ma'am.

Number 4 is that you committed the

22

offense of ignition interlock on February 20 th ,

23

guilty to that Class C Misdemeanor in justice court?

24

DEFENDANT MURRAY:

25

THE COURT:

did you plead

Yes, ma'am.

And No. 6 is that you committed the
3
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1

offense of operating the vehicle without insurance, a Class C

2

Misdemeanor from the same date.

3

DEFENDANT MURRAY:

4

THE COURT:

5

Was that part of your plea?

Yes, ma'am.

And No. 9 is you did not report on

February 23 rd • Do you admit that as well?

6

DEFENDANT MURRAY:

7

THE COURT:

8

I will accept admissions to number 1, 4, 6, and 9

9

as knowingly made today and strike the remaining conditions

10

today.

11

today.

I do.

All of these are 2016 dates.

Those admissions are certainly a basis for my ruling

What is the State and AP&P asking for and then I'll

12
13

Yes,

let the defense respond?
MR. ?:

14

Your Honor, the defendant basically said he

15

didn't want to do supervision.

16

work with him by giving him room sanctions after the

17

violations and he said - we ordered him to report and he, and

18

I see a quote that said uYeah,

19

that."

20

I'm going to do what I want and he got new charges while on

21

probation. He pled to those in a prior to us knowing about

22

them, he pled guilty.

23

reasonable offer on this,

24

probation.

25

He even - AP&P attempted to

I don't,

I don't know about

So he's just basically saying whatever AP&P wants,

THE COURT:

I think a year imposed would be a
just because he doesn't want to do

One of the allegations that we did not
4

--
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1

address was the, his leaving the state, that he didn't report

2

on those days and MR. ?:

3

Yes, there are several instances where he

4

had phone conversations with his agent where he was out-of-

5

state in California, Wyoming,

6

violation of his probation agreement.

Idaho which is in direct

7

THE COURT:

8

And does the State have anything further?

9

MR. SUTTON:

10

13

Thank you.

Your Honor, the State would submit on

that recommendation from AP&P (inaudible).
THE COURT:

11

12

Okay, all right.

Okay, thank you.

Then the defendant's

response?
MS. DUNROE:

I absolutely see how AP&P could have

14

taken Mr. Murray's words and actions as a signal of

15

disrespect.

16

Murray, for perhaps the first time in his life, was met with

17

a situation of homelessness.

18

before then and it was the homelessness that he did not deal

19

with in an appropriate way. And, you know, I say that,

20

don't know what I would do to deal with homelessness but that

21

is the situation he found himself in.

22

him both a place to live and a job and I think during those

23

time periods he was with his dad, he was sober.

24

conversations that maybe preceded that when he did test

25

positive for the use of drugs, they did come at a time when

I don't think he intended them that way.

Mr.

It's not one he had encountered

I

His father could offer

The

5
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1

he had relapsed and I don't know that we should read too much

2

into what someone whose under the influence of substances,

3

you know, may have to say about doing treatment.
But it is clear that Mr. Murray actually has

4
5

established himself as someone who is able and willing to

6

complete treatment and he already did.
Now, certainly his actions after that show that he

7
8

could benefit from more treatment and that's not uncommon

9

either but AP&P has reported that his treatment provider made

10

them aware that he did complete treatment and he did.

That

11

was prior to the relapse which is what happened.

12

understand - which is why I think that he could benefit from

13

additional treatment but that is not to say that Mr. Murray

14

ever intended to just run away and to not deal with any of

15

this.

16

came out of a situation of fear and perhaps some

17

irresponsibility.

18

understands that what he did was not appropriate, that he

19

needs to stay in the state.

20

is different now is that he does in fact have a place to live

21

in the state which he previously did not have.

22

somewhat new development for him and that he can stay in the

23

state and would very much like to complete probation because

24

he did do well.

25

pay the fine which I think is why his probation wasn't closed

I

He dealt with this situation in a way that I think

He and I have discussed that and he

He tells me the situation that

He did well for a while.

That's a

He was unable to

6
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out sooner but that's not uncommon with a fine of close to

2

$3000.

3

treatment again, to do treatment and probation.

4

can complete it, he wants to complete it and frankly, he's

5

already shown us that he has the ability and the desire to at

6

least complete the treatment portion.

And he would very much like the opportunity to do
He thinks he

Again, his plan, and I think AP&P's ideas for him

7

8

sort of went off the rails when he was met with that

9

homelessness and it was a pretty substantial thing for him in

10

his life, a very stressful event that he did not handle

11

appropriately and obviously that caused him to be in

12

violation of his probation.
THE COURT:

13

14

Have there been any new charges other

than this February 20 th case with MS. DUNROE:

15

The AP&P agent and I were able to find

16

a retail theft case that was filed on the date he was booked

17

into jail.

18

THE COURT:

19

MS. DUNROE:

20

THE COURT:

And when was that?
That was November 22~.
And that's why my next question was

21

what ultimately brought him into jail was a new arrest and a

22

new offense,

23

is that -

MS. DUNROE:

That has not been adjudicated and he

24

very much maintains his innocense there.

He has,

to my

25

knowledge, at least what he tells me is a retail theft is not
7
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1

something he's ever committed.

2

theft offenses and he was with a group of people who may have

3

been guilty of that and then he was also arrested for guilty

4

by association.

5

case and that one has not been adjudicated, there's not even

6

a court date for it.

7

THE COURT:

8

9
10
11

12

He doesn't have a history of

So I understand he intends to fight that

And is it still hoiding him or is only

my warrant on this non-compliance?
MS. DUNROE:

I don't have his most current booking

sheet to be able to tell you that but we did find it THE COURT:

And he's been in jail since November

20 th on that arrest or whatever that is.

13

MS. DUNROE:

November 22~.

14

THE COURT:

15

DEFENDANT MURRAY: May I have a quick word?

16

THE COURT:

Twenty-two.

And all right.

I'm going to let you respond

17

ultimately, you get the last word.

18

questions I just wanted to clarify and I may have.

19

did answer it.

There were a couple more
I think I

What is it that you want me to know?
[,.

'-Iii-

20

DEFENDANT MURRAY:

One thing my attorney has

21

already kind of touched on this already but I do have the

22

will to remain sober and clean.

23

for the last three years by completing courses.

24

throughout the entire process and haven't really messed up

25

until basically after the three years was suppose to be up

I've shown that for AP&P,
I've had UAs

8
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1

but due to not being able to pay the fines, then dealing with

2

not having a place to live, kind of got the better of me but

3

I would like to get back on the right track and remain clean

4

and get a job and be a productive member of society.

5

there was one other thing that I wanted to say but I've

6

forgotten at this point.
Yeah, as far as the absconding,

7

And

I just wanted to

8

say that my dad was really just trying to help me out in a

9

tight bind when I didn't have a place to live.

One of his

10

very strict rules was "there will be no drinking or drugs in

11

my house or you will be homeless and I won't be able to help

12

you from there" and I've done some - I've helped my dad, he

13

owns a commercial plumbing business.

14

able to verify that but he would verify for me that I was

15

clean the entire time and working for him and when I came

16

back,

17

is my probation officer but, umrnm, things didn't work out the

18

way I'd planned and was just basically hanging around with

19

the wrong crowd and they were stealing from WalMart.

20

guilty by association but did not steal anything from there

21

and I had told the Walmart security repeatedly that as well

22

so that should go okay.

23

He's not here today or

I had every intention of contacting Agent Whitehead who

THE COURT:

I was

Well, and all of this is important

24

information, Mr. Murray, but what you and your defense

25

attorney are asking me to do is just kind of treat this
9
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1

something different than it is.

We are dealing with a third

2

degree felony DUI.

3

third degree DUI until you have a history of DUI and the

4

sentence that was suspended was not a year in jail, that you

5

don't really want to do because you just really relapsed and

6

were just kind of doing what you thought was best or your dad

7

though was best.

8

suspended prison sentence and that is the sentence that the

9

law provides and I could very fairly impose at his point.

You don't even get to the level of a

You were on probation for a felony with a

10

The factors that you did well at the beginning of probation

11

are factors that I take into consideration but this is not a

12

case where you are just looking at possession of a controlled

13

substance where you relapsed and now you want to get back on

14

track and now you've got a better living situation.

15

You are dealing with a DUI and the fact that you

16

convicted of driving without the ignition interlock

17

protections, the fact that you were consuming alcohol and

18

weren't on probation and weren't compliant, is a danger,

19

danger, dangerous situation to yourself, to your family and

20

to the community as a whole and so the requests that are

21

being made by all sides here - and what I take into

22

consideration is,

23

DUI probation, not that you just decided to do this on your

24

own.

25

into AP&P and saying I've done two years of success,

that you have failed to comply with felony

The answer when you found yourself homeless was going
let's

10
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1

get this done, help me,

2

saying, Well,

3

responsive when AP&P instructed you to come back.

The fact

4

that you have done what you have done, Mr. Murray,

is the

5

basis for my not imposing the prison sentence right now.

6

I need treatment.

It wasn't just

I can blow it off and do it on my own not being

Your requests that you would like an opportunity to

7

do this successfully and do treatment is going to be granted

8

that I'm going to give you an opportunity but it is going to

9

be with a significant sanction and it is going to be with the

10

understanding that if you fail to comply, you're not getting

11

a year in jail to close.

12

So I am revoking and reinstating probation for a

13

period of 12 months from today's date.

The reason that it is

14

so short a time is because you've done a longer time and

15

because if you don't succeed,

16

original sentence as the sanction.

17

is where the difference between your request for a simple

18

possession, a simple relapse,

19

is the factor.

20

beginning from November 22 nd with the order that you

21

successfully complete the CATS Program in jail.

22

released upon successful completion of the CATS Program in

23

jail and you go directly to AP&P and finish your year's worth

24

of probation.

25

qualify for CATS - and it looks like you can - then you

I'm going to be imposing the
However, Mr. Murray, this

a simple just trying to do it,

I am imposing a 180-day jail sentence

You may be

If you don't complete CATS or if you don't

11
' - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -.........-..··---·--~
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1

simply serve the 180-day jail sanction.

This is the way that

2

you keep the prison sentence suspended and this the way that

3

you can ultimately finish probation rather than just calling

4

your own shots and having a year-long jail sentence for an

5

unsuccessful completion.
The financial obligations on a DUI are mandated so

6
7

they are still in place and you still need to figure that

8

out.

9

Good luck,

I think this is the only compromise that

10

you can do but I do think it is a fair one for you.

11

luck, thank you.

Good
~

12

DEFENDANT MURRAY:

Thank you.

13

(Whereupon the hearing was concluded)

14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21

22
23
24
25

(Transcript completed on January 26, 2017)
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